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I. Introduction
One of the most difficult questions in copyright law is the extent of
private property rights over literary and artistic works. Property law
teaches us that rights which entitle owners to exclude and prevent others
from using their property erect barriers that limit public accessibility and
use of these property. One of the main critiques made against copyright
enthusiasts is that their view that copyright's cup of entitlement, being half
full, should continue to be filled as much as possible to ensure that those
who produce creative works should be remunerated for their efforts. These
critiques, eloquently expressed by the many voices guarding the public
domain, argue that the public should be entitled to use literary and artistic
works to freely express views and create other forms of creative works. An
overly extensive system of property rights governing how literary and
artistic works should be used provide dangerous controls that the owner,
exerting rights over public use of the work, will stifle creativity and
freedom. I do believe that property rights in literary and artistic works
have a real potential to create monopolies and deadweight losses in markets
for information goods and that there is presently a need to address the
balance between private rights in copyright against the public domain.
More fundamentally, however, there is a need for us to question the proper
basis for the grant of property rights in literary and artistic works.
Acknowledging that copyright is a reward for economic investment in the
production of creative works will lead us into a confrontation with the
question of how much property rights are needed to reward that
investment-a question that focuses on how much is put into producing the
work. Looking at copyright as a law to encourage creative authorship for
the purposes of connecting authors with society shifts our attention to a
different and, in my mind, a more profound question of how much property
rights are needed to ensure that authors obtain just rewards for their works
from society-a different question that focuses on how much an author
takes from and is responsible to give back to society.
As the introduction of the printing press in England in 1476 marked
the beginning of copyright as a regulatory grant for censorship and press
control, publishers were thought of as the true owners of literary and
artistic works.' Today, owners of creative works have extensive legal
rights to recover investments made in the production and distribution of

1. Members of the book trade in England had developed a printing right when the printing
press was introduced before forming the Stationer's Company in 1557. When Caxton introduced
the pnnting press, there was a need to protect published works. This early form of copyright
protected the interest of members of the book trade. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (1968).
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such works. However, the position of the author in creating a work and
the process of authorship itself, the precise activity that produces works of
literary and artistic value in the commercial marketplace, is seldom
considered as a distinctive component in the copyright equation. Copyright
inquiries into the balance between private rights to control uses of works
and public interests of access to building blocks for the creation of new
works 3 focus on the tensions between owners of rights and advocates of the
public domain. Rights, we believe, must continue to provide the incentive
to produce works without unduly encroaching upon the public's right to use
the work.4 Current scholarship in the field of law and economics and
theories of technological development establish an urgent case for a
balanced copyright system in our society.
To ensure that society's
creative freedom and expression remain free, copyright owners' rights must
reach only as far as necessary to provide an incentive to create and must
not unduly affect society's rights to use and build upon existing works.6 In
economic terms, the social costs society bears for unduly extensive rights is
the inability to benefit from products that the law aims to produce for
learning and growth-literary and artistic works. Property rights that

2. Although authors are recognized as initial owners of copyright (17 U.S.C. § 201(a)
(2000)), ownership may be transferred (§ 201(d)). Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201
(2000). The exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C § 106 (which provides the rights to reproduce, make
derivative works, distribute, publicly perform, display and make digital audio transmissions) may
be owned by someone other than the author. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Section 101, defines the owner of
any of the exclusive rights under § 106 as the owner of the right and not to the author. 17 U.S.C.

§ 101.
3. The benefit the public receives from the author's work justifies granting a monopoly
over the use of works. According to the Supreme Court, a copyright is "the equivalent given by
the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and skills and meditation of individuals." Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). ,
4. Maureen Ryan, Fair Use and Academic Expression: Rhetoric, Reality, and Restriction
on Academic Freedom, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 541-42 (1999).
5. Wendy Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 75, 75 (2004) (arguing for a different set of incentives for authors whose works are
used not for monetary gain but in line with the "freedom to be creative, rewrite, and be
imaginative."); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257
passim (2007) (arguing for proper resource allocation through property rights and showing the
positive effects of innovation spillovers); Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 637 (1996) (arguing that the architecture of the Internet
will protect intellectual property in a manner that is more extensive than the protection that the
law provides).
6. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
285, 288 (1996) (arguing that there is a need for a copyright system to provide support for
democratic civil discourse).
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capture social benefits for copyright owners create deadweight losses that
society should not bear.7
The creative process in the production of literary and artistic works is
a theme in copyright law, which seems to not have gotten sufficient
attention to allow scholars and thinkers of copyright law to view authorship
as the act deserving of property rights granted under the law. Creative
works, by the labor of an author, should properly belong to the author
through the very act of creativity.
However, authors and owners of
copyrighted works are often thought of collectively as the rights holders of
creative works 9 without separating the person who creates a works from the
business that invests in its production and distribution. This may be even
more evident today when large-scale collaboration among many different
authors to produce a single work may happen across geographical borders.
This form of collaboration creates a necessity for the identification of an
institution as the right holder of the collaborative work.' 0 Authorship,
however, is a process that is deeply embedded in existing culture and
convention, which may not benefit from the clear cut boundaries that
copyright law draws to protect owners of these rights. In fact, Northorp

7. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1039-42 (2005) (arguing that intellectual property allows owners to raise price over the
marginal cost and create deadweight losses by raising the price to consumers).
8. The idea that an author should have property rights in his work is predicted on John
Locke's articulation of a man owning, as property, that wluch his labor produces from nature.
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288 (Cambridge University Press 1988) (1960).
London booksellers argued before Parliament that authors had a property right in literary works
based on their labor, which they then could sell to the booksellers. My thoughts on this, which
would require a completely separate analysis, is that transfer of ownership in property nghts in
works by the author should be done in limited situations, if at all. This would suggest
inalienability of property in literary and artistic works and would be a call for a more paternalistic
state intervention into the market for these works.
9. This is particularly so in common law countries, where a natural person who created the
work is not necessary for the recognition of an author. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 205 (2001). Under French law, an author's rights
can only vest in corporations in limited situations--only for collective works and computer
programs created in the course of employment. Id. Under German law, an author must be a
natural person. Id. In the United Kingdom and United States, employers may be the first owners
of copyright although the author is generally recognized as the original owner. Id.
10. According to Professor Goldstein:
Over the past several decades, the problem of identifying a work's author or authors
have been magnified by the trend to large-scale collaboration in the creation of literary
and artistic works. Motion pictures, computer programs, and collective works such as
encyclopedias are examples. This development has placed particular strains on the
civil law tradition, which has had to reconcile a philosophical commitment to the
autonomy of the individual author with the economic pressure to consolidate
ownership in a single individual or institution to facilitate a work's exploitation in the
marketplace.
Id at 204.
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Frye, one of the most distinguished literary critics of the twentieth century,
recognized that new works are not produced independent of existing works
that surround them and that all forms of creative works are built upon
works which are already in existence.'' In Professor Frye's mind, most
works are an imitation of other works but are treated as separate inventions
"distinctive enough to be patented."' 2 The author himself is seldom an
autonomous being, creating works by himself and his process of authorship
hardly ever independent of existing works and cultural influences. 3 The
focus of the law on copyright owners instead of authors as the property
right holders allows individuals and institutions, who may have never
persevered through the process of authorship to assert property rights that
may draw lines "between works,"' 14 prevent public access to existing works

11. To Professor Frye:
It is hardly possible to accept a critical view which confuses the original with the
aboriginal, and imagines that a 'creative' poet sits down with a pencil and some blank
paper and eventually produces a new poem in a special act of creation ex nihilo.
Human beings do not create that way. Just as a new scientific discovery manifests
something that was already latent in the order of nature, and at the same time is
logically related to the total structure of the existing science, so the new poem
manifests something that was already latent in the order of words. Literature may have
life, reality, experience, nature, imaginative truth, social conditions, or what you will
for its content; but literature itself is not made out of these things. Poetry can only be
made out of other poems; novels out of other novels. Literature shapes itself, and is
not shaped externally: the forms of literature can no more exist outside literature than
the forms of sonata and fugue and rondo can exist outside music.
NORTHORP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 97 (Princeton University Press 1971) (1957).
12. See id. at 96. Professor Frye explains:
This state of things makes it difficult to appraise a literature which includes Chaucer,
much of whose poetry is translated or paraphrased from others; Shakespeare, whose
plays sometimes follow their sources almost verbatim; and Milton who asked for
nothing better than to steal as much as possible out of the Bible . . . the central
greatness of Paradise Regained, as a poem, is not the greatness of the rhetorical
decorations that Milton added to his source, but the greatness of the theme itself, which
Milton passes on to the reader from his source.
Id.
13. According to Professor Mark Rose:
What much current literary thought emphasizes ... is that texts permeate and enable
one another, and so the notion of distinct boundaries between texts becomes difficult to
sustain. Indeed, in what sense does the literary work exist objectively at all? Many
critics reject any notion of the text as a stable, independent object, insisting on the
centrality of the reader's role in reproducing the text. Many critics, too, reject any
sense of the text as an object that exists apart from the culture that produced it or the
succeeding cultures that have appropriated and, for their own purposes, reproduced it.
Thus the concept of the historically transcendent masterpiece, the notion of the work
that speaks to us directly, person to person, across the age disappears, and along with it
goes the notion of the creative genius, the autonomous author.
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 3 (1993).
14. See id.
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that are necessary for the creation of new works,'

5

and introduce an

of those rights.16
economic bias to the arguments for strict enforcement
This article argues that that the more central theme to the copyright
equation is the right of the author. By recognizing author's rights as
property rights as distinct from the present copyright owner's rights, the
law will be able to provide society with the works that copyright law aims
to produce through the grant of property rights and the freedom to use these
works for the development of new works through a more efficient market.
Market inefficiencies, which result from a market for a good that cannot be
7
accurately priced to reflect the activities of the producer and consumer,'
may be corrected to a large extent by identifying the author as the producer
of the work and his or her readers as the consumer. A system that places
authors as the property right owner of the work will create very different
market dynamics from the present as soon as we attach property rights to
the process of authorship and separate the author from the owner of the
right. When we connect authors to their readers, we will see the emergence
of a market for creative and literary works which is less prone to
inefficiencies and failures and is better equipped for an efficient allocation
of resources. This requires a separation of authors from the present
definition of "owners" under the present copyright system and the
15. This is particularly so especially when new technologies provide the public with the
ability to capture and share information, knowledge and stories. The need to ask permission for
the use of existing works creates a presumption that use of works without prior permission is
illegal and creates a chilling effect on creativity. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL

CREATIVITY 185 (2004).
16. Businesses often provide economic reasons to enforce their rights when their products
are pirated. These reasons are often the loss of sales, the competitive disadvantage to enterprises
that free-nde on the research and development and marketing expenses of legitimate enterprises,
the possibility of product liability from defective imitation products, loss or goodwill or prestige
by a brand, where counterfeits are freely available, and the expense of monitoring the market and
Michael Blakeney, The Phenomenon of
instituting legal proceedings against infringers.
Counterfeiting and Piracy in the European Union: FactualOverview and Legal and Institutional
Framework, in ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH BORDER
MEASURES, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE EU 7 (Oliver Vrins & Marius Schneider eds., 2006).

17. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structuraland Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 (1982). Professor
Gordon explains:
Copyright markets will not, however, always function adequately. Though the
copyright law has provided a means for excluding nonpurchasers and thus has
attempted to cure the public goods problem, and though it has provided mechanisms to
facilitate consensual transfers, at times bargaining may be exceedingly expensive or it
may be impractical to obtain enforcement against nonpurchasers, or other market flaws
might preclude achievement of desirable consensual exchanges. In those cases, the
market cannot be relied on to mediate public interest in dissemination and private
interests in remuneration.
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conceptualization of non-authors as interest or privilege holders. As with

any grant of privilege, non-authors are limited in what they are entitled to.' 8
This article concludes with a proposal: if we conceive copyright law as an
institution to correct market failures,' 9 the conception of the author as the
primary property right holder provides an opportunity for copyright as an

institution to set a more balanced approach for the grant of property rights
to encourage the process of authorship for the ultimate benefit of society.

II. Ownership of Authorship
At the heart of the copyright system is the author of a creative work.

The Berne Convention, establishing a union to protect literary and artistic
works, recognizes by virtue of Article 1 that the rights being protected
through copyright law are the rights of authors. 20 Authors are the first
beneficiaries of rights under the law and provide a reference point as to
how long rights over the work should exist. 2 1 However, authors are not
identified with as much precision as the rights protected under law 22 and
this may be because of the divergences in national law on some aspects of
authorship after the Convention was promulgated. 3 In 1990, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), in the draft "Model Provisions
for Legislation in the Field of Copyright," attempted to provide a definition
for an author, which would incorporate the divergent views of what would
18. Professor Augustine Birrell explains:
The struggle, 'Property or Privilege,' has substance in it. If authors or their assignees
could make out that their right to the exclusive multiplication of copies of their books
ought to be regarded as property, in the same way as lands, houses, goods and chattels,
it followed that this right was one of indefinite duration, and could be so disposed of in
the market inter vivos, or bequeathed or left to descend to relatives according to the
laws of inheritance. If, on the other hand, it was not property but privilege, then its
term of enjoyment could and would be measured, limited, restricted, according to the
wording of the Letters Patent, or of the Act of the Legislature or other document which
created it.
AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 14 (1899).
19. In a previous article, I suggested that we may view copyright law as providing the
institutional intervention needed to correct market inefficiencies where the producer of a creative
work would like to capture positive externalities created from the work. Alma Ng, Copyright's
Empire: Why the Law Matters, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 337, 356 (2007).
20. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 1, Jul. 24 1971,
1161 U.N.T.S. 18338.
21. Id. at art. 7 (measures the term of protection granted under the convention as the life of
the author plus fifty years).
22.

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION

AND BEYOND 358 (Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
23. Common law courts have emphasized more on the labor and skill needed to produce
new works in recognizing authors for protection under the law while civil law countries such as
Germany will judge the level of creativity involved in producing the work before granting
protection. See id. at 359-60
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amount to authorship. 24 This draft law raised significant disagreement
among member states and interest holders, and WIPO's work on producing
When the WIPO Copyright Treaty was
a Draft Model Law ceased.
produced in 1996, the treaty, although stating in its preamble that it desired
to "develop and maintain the protection of the rights of the authors in their
literary and artistic works in a manner26 as effective and uniform as
possible," did not define who an author is.
However, connecting the original author and the process of authorship
with the grant of property under copyright provides us with a deeper
understanding to the questions we ask about rights and access in copyright
law. As Professor Peter Jaszi argues, the construct of authorship has been
"deployed and transformed in legal discourse and has given rise to
important doctrinal structures in the law of copyright" even though the
notion of authorship has been an uncritically accepted one.2 7 The present
structure for copyright law is grounded on an unquestioned acceptance of
authorship that entitles authors to rewards for that "distinct and privileged
category of activity, that generates products of special social value., 28 But
the idea of authorship goes beyond an identification of just rewards for
creative activities and really is, as Professor Jaszi thinks, the "specific
locus" of the private rights-public access contradiction,29 which lies at the
heart of copyright law. 30 Far from being a noncontroversial idea in
copyright thought, the idea of authorship shapes our conceptualization of
the law. The use of the concept of authorship in previously decided cases
has had the effect of separating the author from the work itself,3 1 has
allowed works of minimal creative effort to be protected by the law, 32 and
24. Id. at 361.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 362-63.
27. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosesof "Authorship," 1991
DUKE L.J. 455, 467 (1991).
28. See id. at 466.
29. See id. at 457.
30. The United States Constitution gives "Congress... [the] Power to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.
31. The romantic idea that the author is tied to the creative fruits of his labor as an
expression of individualism and an assertion of self in an infinite and transcendental sense was
replaced as the idea of what amounted to a "work" became a central consideration in the courts'
adjudication of infringement cases as in the cases of West v Francis,D'Almaine v. Boosey and
Stowe v. Thomas. See Jaszi, supra note 22, at 476-77.
32. Professor Jaszi cites Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. and Alfred Bell & Co. v.
CataldaFine Arts, Inc. and explains:
The Bleistein opinion, with its emphasis on the "work" and its abdication of a judicial
role as aesthetic arbiter, both effaces and generalizes "authorship," leaving this
category with little or no meaningful content and none of its traditional associations.
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33
has created the conditions for a market for literary works to exist.
Authorship in copyright today is a legal artifact allowing a market for
creative works to function and at the same time is also a reversion to early
versions of romantic authorship that allows autonomous individuality on
the part of the author. Seen this way, the concept of authorship provides a
fundamental contradiction between collective market economics of
commercialization and the individual prerogatives of an author to exercise
complete control over how the work is used.34
The cursory treatment of the idea of authorship by international
copyright conventions and the unquestioned acceptance of the idea as a
central part of the law necessitates a deeper analysis of the role that the

In so doing, the opinion rationalizes a significant expansion of copyright protection. In
effect, the revision of "authorship" in Bleistein was instrumental in broadening and
generalizing the category of works that could be considered as copyrightable
commodities . . . Alfred Bell completed the partial transformation of copyright
doctrine that began in Bleistein. This maneuver secured for many modestly aesthetic
productions the same advantages of copyright protection afforded to conventional
literary and artistic works. From a commercial standpoint, these advantages are very
significant indeed. In one sense, the effacement and revision of "authorship"
performed in these opinions represents a simple response to economic pressures, which
generated demand for legal regulation of the market for new categories of intangible
In another sense, these decisions represent the last stage in the
goods.
commercialization of cultural production. Under Alfred Bell's "minimalist" and
"democratized" vision of "authorship," copyright doctrine offers no sound basis for
distinguishing between oil paintings, art reproductions, motion pictures, lamp bases,
poems, and inflatable plastic Santa Clauses.
Id. at 483-85.
33. Professor Jaszi explains:
[T]he identification of the autonomous "work" as the subject of copyright protection
was crucial to the development of the secondary market in literary and artistic
productions. Practically, rapid change in reproduction and distribution technologies
called for an abstract concept of the subject of legal protection. Ideologically, the new
emphasis on the "work" minimized the threat to free exchange posed by the notion of
an intimate link between the "author" and her productions ... the maturation of the
"work" as a legal concept increased the leverage of publishers and other purchasers of
"authors" rights. Once the penumbral concept of the "work" was firmly in place, the
purchasers could acquire a general dominion over the imaginative territory of a
particular literary or artistic production. Publishers could use this "authority" to
exclude from the territory not only strangers but the very "author" who first delimited
it.

Id. at 478.
34. Professor Jaszi summarizes his ideas by stating:
In sum, "authorship" is simultaneously an artifact of the marketplace in commodity art
and a throwback to early, preindustrial ideas of the artist's relation to society. Thus
regarded, "authorship" contains within itself the contradiction at the base of all
copyright doctrine. The conflict is not the familiar opposition between ownership and
access, but the more fundamental, generative tension between the collectivism of the
marketplace and the prerogatives of the autonomous individual.
Id. at 502.
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concept of authorship can play in our effort to identify a solution to the
private rights-public access contradiction, which has permeated legal
thinking throughout copyright law's history. 35 The author and the very
process of authorship itself are so special to the law of copyright that this
article argues that property rights given by law must be attached to the
author who creates literary and artistic works, and that the process of
authorship and creativity itself should form the basis for the grant of an
exclusive property right in a work. The economic incentive justification
for the grant of property rights in literary and artistic works, I think, do not
afford as cogent an argument for protecting literary and artistic works,
because justifying property rights over literary and artistic works in
economic terms will put works intended to benefit society in a commercial
market and made available only to paying segments of society. Facilitated
by property rights over works, this will create inevitable boundaries to
access as copyright owners seek to recover consumer surpluses and
positive externalities, which should be left to the public for further
development. By recognizing property rights in literary and artistic works
because an author, through a creative process of authorship, produced a
work, copyright law will reward creativity that benefits society and allow
authors a more stable connection with their readers and audiences.
I begin this article with the idea of an author and the process of
authorship to demonstrate the reason why property rights are rightfully
attached to the creative and autonomous author rather than the investor
seeking to recover the investment in the commercial market. I argue that
attaching property rights to authors and not the more general category of
owners (which may include non-authors) changes many of the economic
arguments that justify the expansion of rights into the public domain and
provides a more substantial argument for greater public access for the
development of new works. The recognition of authors and the process of
creative authorship will also change the role of copyright law as an
institution that balances private control and public access where new
technologies allow private ordering of rights to an institution that
encourages and facilitates creativity for the benefit of society. Only
through the author's conceptions and authorship in greater depth can we
35. In his foreword to Professor Benjamin Kaplan's James Carpentier Lectures, Dean
William Warren speaks of the challenges in balancing different social interests and notes that it is
significant that this balance between the interests of the creator and the interests of society is
couched in constitutional language. William C. Warren, Foreword to BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, at vii (1967). Robert Kastenmeier's foreword to The Nature
of Copyright makes a similar observation by noting that the consumer's need to freely use
material is a consistent factor against the author or distributor of creative works. Robert
Kastenmeier, Foreword to L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF
COPYRIGHT, at xi (1991).
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reach a fairer allocation of creative resources between segments of society
that are willing and able to pay for the use of creative works and the
majority of society, which may not have access to or the ability to pay for
the use of creative works but which may36 be in greater need for such works
for education, growth and development.
A. The Author

The author in copyright history, especially before the Statute of
Anne,37 had been regarded as a separate entity from the printer or publisher
of a work. The distinguishable rights of a book owner over the manuscript
as a physical object made out of ink and parchment from the rights of an
author over the text itself indicated an early separation between the person
who created the work and the person who invested in publishing it. 38 In
fact, early forms of copyright practiced by the book trade showed more of
an economic interest by the book-sellers in the physical embodiment of a
text rather than the text itself.39 Printing privileges that were given to
printers in the 1400s allowed books to be printed in large quantities and

36. Access to educational materials, for example, is crucial to the development of human
resources to contribute to the economic development of developing countries. Through education
the quality of life of citizens of developing countries improves. Underpinning the Millennium
Development Goals is education, which works towards eradicating poverty, reducing child
mortality and combating HIV/AIDS. Four years of primary education raises the output of a
farmer in Uganda by 7 percent. A Zambian mother with primary education would be able to give
her child a 25 percent better chance at survival than a mother without education, and HIV
infection among educated girls are significantly lower. CONSUMER INTERNATIONAL, COPYRIGHT
AND ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON FLEXIBILITY IN COPYRIGHT
LAWS 1-2 (2006), available at http://www.consumidoresint.org/a2k/.
37. The Statute of Anne, passed by the English Parliament in 1710, is the first copyright
statute and was intended by Parliament to be an "Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, during the
Times therein mentioned." Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
38. ROSE, supra note 13, at 9. Professor Rose states, "the rights of the bookowners had
nothing to do with authorship. True copyright is concerned with rights in texts as distinct from
rights in material objects, and its historical emergence is related to print technology."
39. Id. The primary difference between the interests of the author and the publisher was the
value each placed in the work. The author would regard a single piece of work as a product of his
labor and therefore of great emotional value to him. The publisher is more concerned with the
costs of printing a book in multiple copies. Professor Rose states this point more clearly when he
explains:
A manuscript could be produced by one man with a pen and a supply of parchment.
Printing an edition of a book, however, required a much more substantial investment
of capital than the production of a manuscript, and it resulted not in a single precious
object, which often would have been commissioned in advance, but in multiple copies
that had to be distributed over time. Printers needed assurance that they would be able
to recoup their investment, and so some system of trade regulation as necessary if
printing was to flourish.
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distributed. This encouraged a capitalistic enterprise, book trade, to
develop though not creative endeavors through autonomous authorship.4
Authors were given separate privileges, but it appeared from the privileges
granted to authors, editors, translators and printers that even in fifteenth
century Venice, a fusion of authorship and the print business existed.4'
The recognition of the author as a separate and autonomous creative
individual however, is apparent in the treatment of authors by members of
the Stationers' Company 42 in Elizabethan England. The main interest of
the printers was the publication and distribution of a work by providing an
orderly system within the book trade that allowed for the exclusive right to
publish.43 It was quite apparent that the publisher's right was an economic
right to publish, which was separate from the author's creative rights over
the integrity of the work. 4 A conveyance of rights from the author to the
publisher at that time was a conveyance of rights over the publication of the
manuscript, and not a conveyance of the intrinsic value of the creative
work. 45 Authors, who sold their manuscripts to publishers, were required

40.

JANE BERNSTEIN, PRINT CULTURE AND MUSIC IN THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY 10 (2001).

Professor Bernstein explains in her book that in the fifteenth century:
Venice offered an ideal center for the printing of books. It boasted the best and most
advanced distribution system in the world. And because its printers and publishers
could not all rely on the patronage of a rules or the church but depended mainly on
market forces in order to make their living, the Venetian printing industry, from its
inception, became a capitalistic enterprise, producing books in larger quantities and
distributing them much further afield than any other European center.
Id.
41. ROSE, supra note 13, at 10. Professor Rose explains:
The first author's privilege was one granted in 1486 to Marc' Antonio Sabellico, the
historian of Venice, for his Decades rerum Venetarum. According to the grant,
Sabellico could choose which printer would publish his book, and any other printer
who publish it would be fined 500 ducats. Other privileges issued to authors included
one in 1492 to Petro Francesco da Ravenna for Foenix, a pamphlet designed to
improve the memory, and one in 1515 to Ariosto, who received lifetime rights in his
Orlando furioso with a penalty for infringement set at 1000 ducats. The variety of
recipients of privileges-authors, editors, translators, printers-suggests that traces of
the medieval conflation of writing and the production of writing under the general
conception of "making books" persisted in fifteenth-century Venice.
Id.
42. The Stationers' Company was the English guild that comprised bookbinders,
booksellers and printers and were primarily responsible for originating the concept of copyright
as a right to control the printing and publishing of books. Established on May 4, 1557 by way of
Royal Charter, the Stationers' Company was able to develop the concept of copyright into a
monopoly over the book trade because of the sanction it received from the Crown, which was
granted as a way to control and censor the press. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 28-41.
43. Id. at 71.
44. These creative rights of authors allow authors to prevent distortions of the work by
others and thereby maintaining the integrity of the work. Id.
45 Id. at 73.
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to agree to refrain from interfering with the publication of the work, which
was the right that the publishers sought. John Milton's contract for the
publication of Paradise Lost included a covenant that prevented his
interference with the publication of the work.4 6 Professor Patterson argues
that this covenant indicated the retention of certain rights over the work.
Even though the manuscript is sold, a negative covenant was created by the
transfer of rights over the manuscript, as opposed to an outright sale of the
work. In other words, although the author transfers the right to print and
publish the work to the publisher, the author does not transfer any of the
intrinsic value of the work. Rather the author retains the intrinsic value,
and the publisher can only exercise the limited right to publish through the
negative covenant that prevents the author from interfering with the
exercise of that right.47
Professor Patterson's conception of the author as having rights
independent and autonomous from the stationer's copyright prior to the
enactment of the Statute of Anne is an important one that modem copyright
law may not have adequately acknowledged. 48 This idea is important to
copyright jurisprudence because it separates an author's rights over how
the work is used by his readers from the limited economic right his
publisher has to publish and distribute the work. This demarcation
provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which readers may have
freedom in using the creative components of a work, which only an
autonomous author is entitled to restrict. The right of the publisher is
purely the right to make copies of the work as a non-possessory interest, as
opposed to a property right, and will not entitle publishers to assert rights
over how an author's reader uses the creative work. Seen in this light,
publishers of creative works (which today may be owners of copyright) do

46. Id. at 74.
47. Professor Patterson explains that the basic premise of the author-publisher relationship
is this:
[T]hat the stationers recognized a duty on their part to pay the author and to obtain his
permission to publish his work. That permission, from a legal standpoint, was a
negative rather than an affirmative one. The author's conveyance was in effect a
negative covenant-that is, a contract not to object to the publication of the work,
rather than a contract granting a right to publish it.
Id. at 73. To Professor Patterson:
The distinction is more than one of semantics, and it is helpful because we have here a
unique example of a chattel being conveyed not for its intrinsic value, but to enable the
purchaser to exercise the right which is being conveyed. The manuscript is more than
a symbol, of which a stock certificate is an example, but less than the object of
purchase, of which the book itself is an example.
Id. at 75.
48. Id. at 77. In fact, the Statute of Anne may have destroyed the rights that an author has
over the work by virtue of his creativity. BIRRELL, supra note 18, at 21.
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not possess the legal right to control the way the public use the work. The
only claim that copyright owners (aside from the autonomous author) are
entitled to, then, is the economic returns from the right to print, publish,
and distribute the work. Based on this argument, the use of the work by
readers of the work should not be within the control of the publisher, but
should lie with the author.
The acknowledgement of authorship and the very act of creativity in
writing books defined the autonomous author as separate and independent
from his publisher. In opposing censorship and state licensing of book
printing, John Milton's Areopagitica speech 49 elevated the author to a
dignified creator of works, who should not be subjected to the control of
printers through royal and ecclesiastical censorship. 50 Authors, to John
Milton, summon all reason and deliberation in the process of authorship
51
and engage in a process of searching, meditating, and industriousness.
They are very likely going to consult and confer with other authors to be
informed in the area in which they write. 2 This diligent process of
authorship puts authors at a stage of maturity that should not put them
within the control of their printers, who may be younger, inferior in
judgment and not aware of the labors that accompany the process of
authorship. 3 In fact, to Milton, subjecting authors to the control of their
printers and publishers, dishonors and derogates them, the book they wrote,
and the dignity of learning.54 Contents of a book to Milton, were creative
ideas preserved in a vessel that were a "living intellect" of an author that
should not be controlled, and the destruction of a book was a destruction of
reason because the ideas in a book were "the precious lifeblood" of the
author that was "embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond
life. 55 Milton's speech made prior to the enactment of the Statute of Anne
pointed out some fundamental concepts in copyright thinking. The first is
the concept that authors think and deliberate about their work in
consultation and conferment with other authors.56 Ideas, being building
49. John Milton, Areopagitica,For the Liberty of Unlicenc 'd Printing,to the Parliamentof
England, http://www.dartmouth.edu/-milton/reading-room/areopagitica/ (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
50. The objection to censorship and licensing was against the Licensing Act 1643 that
prohibited the pnnting and importing of books without the consent of the copyright owner.
RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 21-22 (1912).
51. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 71.
52. Id.
53. Id. See also ROSE, supra note 13, at 28.
54. Milton, supra note 49, at 12.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Authorship necessarily encompasses an author's works and materials drawn from other
authors. Jessica Litman argues that all authors are somewhat influenced in some degree by the
works of others. As Professor Litman says it, "[tihe man who never knew Keats but composed an
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blocks for new works, are generated through a thought process that
involves using ideas and works that belong to others.5 7 The second concept
raised in Milton's speech is that a work is an embodiment of an author's
ideas that continues to influence and shape future thought and authorship
after the author passes on.5 8 Both these concepts are important in
conceptualizing copyright today. An author's ideas are shaped by those
before him and will shape the ideas of those after him. 59 The responsibility
copyright law bears to ensure that these ideas are not inaccessible to those
who need them in their writing and process of authorship may be met
through the recognition that rights should only properly vest with the
author of a work.
In more recent literature, the author is seen as the creator of the work,
who stands independently from the publisher in the copyright economy.
Implicit in Professor Cornish's 2002 paper, The Author as Risk-Sharer, is
identical Ode by magic is a mythical fellow." Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.
J. 965, 1000 (1990)
57.

LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A

CONNECTED WORLD 105 (2001). Professor Lessig explains:
The new builds on the old, and hence depends to a degree, on access to the old.
Academics writing textbooks about poetry need to be able to criticize and hence to
some degree, use the poetry they write about. Playwrights often base their plays upon
novels by others. Novelists use familiar plots to tell their story. Historians use facts
about the history they retell. Filmmakers retell stories from our culture. Musicians
write within a genre that itself determines how much of the past content it needs to be
within the genre ... All of this creativity depends in part on access to, and use of the
already created.
Id.
58. William Shakespeare was collaborative in his literary and cultural productions. Most of
his works were derived from classical and modem history and well-known tales of the late
Middle Ages and Renaissance period. ROSE, supra note 13, at 25. It was only in the latter part of
the eighteenth century that Shakespeare was introduced as an individuated author and adulated.
Id. at 122-24.
59. Professor Wendy Gordon, in exploring institutional remedies for the use of copyrighted
works that are more inclined to be transformative and useful (as opposed to merely instrumental
for the purposes of generating income), states:
All artists create using much they have not created, both in terms of physical and
human surroundings and in terms of cultural heritage. The holders of a common
cultural tradition resemble the inhabitants of Locke's state of nature: their riches are
largely not of their own making. An artist's relationship to her tradition sometimes
involves quotation and imitation in ways that implicate copyright law. The law
insufficiently recognizes that, because predecessors also built on tradition, the claims
that they can rightfully assert against the makers of later art should be limited. Current
copyright law understates those limits, largely because the law conceives of the
"public domain" as an area free of obligations. Under current law, anyone can copy
from the public domain, and claim copyright in what he has added, regardless of
whether doing so will impair others' use of the underlying domain that all inherited
together.
Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar,supra note 5, at 78.
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the argument that authors should be given separate interests over their work
through their very act of creativity in producing the work.6 ° Professor
Cornish's paper is concerned with the relationship between the author as
the creator of a literary and artistic work and his publisher or producer, who
is the "entrepreneur" responsible for publishing and distributing the work
to the public. 61 Authors, for a myriad of reasons, have chosen to engage
their publishers in a relationship that allowed allows them to retain their
rights rather than transfer complete ownership to their publishers and
distributors through an outright sale, even though their publishers and
distributors are better able to bear the risks of introducing and distributing
the work to the public.62 Copyright laws in European civil law traditions,
such as France and Germany, have traditionally adopted a paternalistic
attitude towards authors because of a strong acknowledgement of the
autonomous personality of the author and have taken legislative steps to
ensure that authors are remunerated adequately.63
Beyond a mere
protectionist attitude towards authors however, is a more conscious effort
to preserve the real benefits of a law that is based on the creative act of
authorship, to the author. 64 Otherwise the need to have copyright laws
today may be replaced by "producers' investment laws" 65 that protect
economic investments made by publishers in the publication and
distribution of works.
The author's distinct right, however, was not clearly separated from
the rights of publishers and printers over the work, and the Statute of
Anne 66 and subsequent early English copyright decisions did not explicitly
set the author's rights aside from the publisher's rights.67 Since then, the
60. William Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2002).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3-4.
63. Id. at6-11.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id.
66. The author is not mentioned specifically in the Statute. The only benefit that authors
had over their publishers was the right to renew the copyright. Beside that right to renewal for
two consecutive fourteen year period, the author did not have greater rights than his publisher or
anyone who is given the rights by the author. Professor Patterson comments that "[t]he only
difference between an author's securing a copyright and another's securing a copyright was that
the author did not have to purchase the right." PATTERSON, supra note 1,at 146.
67. Donaldson v. Beckett, 17 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. 953 (1813), laid down the rule that any
rights that the author had by way of common law was replaced by the rights provided for in the
Statute of Anne. Professor Augustine Birrell laments:
Whether this judicial opinion as to the existence at Common Law of perpetual
copyright in an author and his assigns was sound may well be doubted, and possibly if
the House of Lords had held in Donaldson v. Beckett that perpetual copyright had
survived Queen Anne, an Act of Parliament would, sooner or later, have been passed
curtailing the rights of authors. But how annoying, how distressing, to have evolution
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author's rights over his work were never explicitly acknowledged as a
possible set of rights, which could exist as the entitlement that authors have
over their work and from which the economic rights to print and publish
free from interference are derived.6 8 This situation, where the author's
rights are treated as inseparable and equal to the rights of publishers and
printers, causes significant difficulties in ensuring that private incentives
provided to authors under the law are sufficient to generate creative works
for use by the public, especially when the rights are enforced by owners of
rights, who may not have necessarily created the work. 69 A shift of focus

to the process of creativity and authorship will arguably make copyright
analysis more balanced as rights and incentives are tied to the very act of
creating for the public, removing the law from a trade or market regulating
role to a creativity or authorship facilitating role. The balance between
artificially arrested and so interesting a question stifled by an ignorant legislature, set
in motion not be an irate populace clamoring for cheap books . . . but by the authors
and their proprietors, the bookseller.
BIRRELL, supra note 18, at 22.
68. In the United States, the decision of Wheaton v. Peters arrived at the conclusion that the
first copyright statute in the United States, the Copyright Act 1790 created a new statutory
copyright and did not sanction an existing right at common law that belonged to the author. 33
U.S. 591 (1834). Professor Craig Joyce states:
The basic premise of the Court's opinion-that copyright is a monopoly recognized by
law primarily for the benefit of the public rather than the author, and is therefore
attended by appropriate limitations and conditions-has remained the cornerstone of
construction in this field down to the present day. Likewise, the federal courts have
never since doubted that, upon publication, the author's common law right of property
in his manuscript comes to an end, to be replaced, if at all, by an entirely new statutory
right in the copies of his work; or that, in deference to the public's paramount interest
in the wide dissemination of ideas, the latter may be fully secured only upon faithful
compliance with the formalities prescribed by Congress.
Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter- An InstitutionalPerspective on Marshall
CourtAscendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1386-1387 (1985).
69. Copyright owners, who do not engage in the process of authorship and creativity, may
not understand the thought process of an author is producing a work. Professor Wendy Gordon
foresees a problem when new authors are confronted with the need to calculate the costs for using
existing works. Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers and Public Goods: Trading Gold for
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 190-191 (2002). Professor Gordon speaks of Lewis Hyde and
his book The Gift, which provides that an important part of the process of authorship is the
gratitude that a new author has for his predecessor's work, instilling in the new author a sense of
gratitude, which he then repays with his new creation. Monetary payment and a sense of
calculation will interfere with this process. Id. Professor Gordon states:
Imagine a composer inspired by a book that she read as a child to make an opera of it.
Can you imagine her genuine impulse of creativity surviving the calculating process?
Calculating the license cost; comparing the cost of that license with the license to use
other books; manufacturing an inspiration to match whatever book bore a license fee
she can afford ... that is not the way that many of our best creative people operate.
Those whose motivation is intrinsic are not free to calculate, to search for the cheapest
license or the author's heir who doesn't object to being reinterpreted and criticized.
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public interests and private rights 70 may be found in the role authors have
to play in the process of creating literary and artistic works for their
readers.
The author of a work need not be a literary or artistic genius for
copyright to be granted in his work. Most authors use existing works in
their authorship 7I and the idea that an author produces a work without
deriving inspiration and direction from the works around him idolizes an
72
author and the realities of collaborative authorship in a surreal fashion.
What is more important, as Professor Jane Ginsburg comments, is the
human creativity that lies at the heart of any copyright regime, whether it is
the common or civil law.73 To Professor Ginsburg, the author is the
"human creator who, notwithstanding the constraints of her task, succeeds74
in exercising minimal personal autonomy in her fashioning of the work.,
The right that an author has to exert control over the work stems from the
act of molding the work to the author's vision.75 Professor Ginsburg
identifies six principles of authorship, which point towards the nature of
activities that can properly constitute authorship, which can be applied to
this article to set out the proper conditions for authorship for the purposes
of protection of the work. The first principle, that authorship places mind
over muscle, identifies the author as the one who conceptualizes the work
and not the person executing directions to complete the work.76 The
second principle is that the more the author relies on a machine, for
example a camera or a computer, to produce the work, the more an author
70. "The balance the law traditionally strikes is between the protections granted the author
and the public use or access granted everyone else. The aim is to give the author sufficient
incentive to produce. Built into the law of intellectual property are limits on the power of the
author to control use of the ideas she has created." LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS
OF CYBERSPACE 134 (1999).

71. Professor Benjamin Kaplan commenting on the standard of proof for original authorship
in a copyright dispute states:
The defendant in an infringement action may have a hard job establishing by definite
proof that the plaintiff resorted to prior works and was thus a copyist not an author,
even when there is a good natural chance that he did so because similar works
abounded. But if that was the condition of the prior art, the defendant may well be
believed when he undertakes to show that he took from that store and not from the
plaintiff. . the courts will sometimes hold simply on a footing of common sense,
without precise proof, that the plaintiff must have leaned whether consciously or not
on the preexisting material.
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 44 (1966).

72. Shakespeare, for example, was made to be "the epitome of original genius" even though
his work was essentially a collaborative. ROSE, supra note 13, at 122-24.
73. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 (2003).
74. Id.at 1092.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1072.
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must demonstrate that he produced the work. 7 The third principle equates
originality with authorship although the standard for what amounts to
originality differs from case law to case law. 78 The fourth principle is that
skilled reproductions are works of authorship. 79 The fifth principle requires
intent on the part of the creator of the work to be regarded as the author,
which may become more of an issue when there is contention of authorship
status in a collaboratively produced work.80 And, the sixth principle is the
presumption of authorship for works made for hire.8
The six principles of authorship set out by Professor Ginsburg identify
the parameters wherein different constituents within the process of
authorship may be identified for the purposes of rewarding the author for
creative production. 82 Authors, who demonstrate mental activity, skill and
effort, originality, and intent to engage in the process of authorship, deserve
the recognition provided by copyright laws to exert artistic control over
uses of the work. Where authors produce creative works, they should be
entitled to the protection that copyright proclaims to provide.83 This article
focuses on the first five principles of Professor Ginsburg's principles of
authorship. The sixth principle, the principle that works for hire are
presumed to provide the employer of the author with first authorship, is a
principle that adheres to the economic justification for investors of
copyrighted materials being given the full protection of the law because of
their investment and control over how the work is produced. The work-forhire provisions in copyright are classic examples of a deviation from
common principles of authorship and creativity explored in this article

77. Id. at 1077.
78. Id. at 1078-82.
79. Id. at 1082-85.
80. Id. at 1085-88. To Professor Ginsburg:
Intent does not make a contributor more or less creative, but it may supply a means to
sort out the equities of ownership in cases in which more than one contender is vying
for authorship status. There, t1ie problem is not so much whether the contenders
intended to be creative, as to whether they intended to share the spoils of creativity,
that is, whether they intended to be joint owners of the copyright.
Id. at 1087.
81. Id. at 1088-92.
82. Professor Ginsburg calls these the "Six Principles in Search of an Author" to synthesize
the authorities in three common law (United States, United Kingdom, and Australia) and civil law
countries (France, Belgium, and Holland) as well as Canada, a mixed jurisdiction country. Id. at
1071-72.
83. Cornish, supra note 60, at 12. Providing a moral justification for protecting creativity is
what the copyright system is about. Id. Protecting authors and the process of authorship is the
reason "we continue to have copyright laws which derive their legal value and moral force from
the act of creativity." Id.
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section. 4 Authorship here does not vest with the author who created and
produced the work through a lengthy process of authorship but rather vests
with an employer, whose economic interests in protecting the work may
obscure the more important aspects of the quest for creativity under the
law. 85 Property rights in literary and artistic works, which provide a
significant amount of control over how accessible creative works are for
public use, should only be granted when an author produces the work
through a process of thought, collaboration, and expression in the true spirit
of authorship.
B. Property Rights in Literary and Artistic Works

Among the numerous reasons given to justify the grant of property
rights in literary and artistic works,86 the natural justice argument is perhaps
84. In the United States, this is provided for by § 201(b) of the Copyright Act 1976, which
gives an employer all of the rights in the copyright. 17 U.S.C § 201(b) (2000). A demonstration
of the hiring party's right to control the "manner and means by which the product is
accomplished" is sufficient for the party to be regarded as an employer for the purposes of the act.
Some of the considerations, though not exclusive, are:
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Cmty. of Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1988).
85. Ginsburg, supra note 73, at 1091-92. Professor Ginsburg asks:
[S]hould we conclude that, despite the U.S. constitutional nod to authors, and modem
Continental driot d' auteur, copyright in essence designs to reward the best exploiter?
Or should we maintain that vesting authorship in employers for hire is an aberration
whose aspirations to the copyright mainstream we should resist lest copyright lose both
its humanist cast and the moral appeal that flows therefrom? ... [a] copyright law for
"continuity experts" or, as the French might more pithily put it, "le droit d' auteur sans
auteur," is what generalization of the U.S. doctrine of works made for hire and its
foreign law analogues ultimately promises. It is not, I believe, what modem
copyright/authors' rights laws were meant to protect. Without belittling the role of
investment in common and civil law copyright regimes, those regimes moral center,
their reason d'etre, remains human creativity.
Id.
86. Four major arguments can be advanced to justify the copyright system: first, natural
justice, where an author's expression of his personality in the work justify the grant of rights;
second, the economic, argument, where reward is given to those who invest in the production of
creative works through the grant of rights; third, the cultural argument that rewarding creativity
for the production of creative works that are of considerable national asset and fourth, the social
argument that creative works contribute to the advancement of society and their creation should
therefore be rewarded through the copyright system. STEPHEN STEWART, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 3-4 (2d ed. 1989). The copyright system has also been
seen as playing an important role in allowing for "public education and expressive diversity"
within a democratic civil society. Netanel, supra note 6, at 324.
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the strongest justification in the United States and in most commons law
traditions. 87 Based most commonly on John Locke's theory that a person
should have property over that which he labors and that an author should be
allowed to control a work that is an external representation of his inner
personality, 88 the natural rights justification provides a moral basis for the
recognition of property rights in works. 9 In more recent times, economics
have provided a further justification for the grant of property rights over
creative works that are essentially public goods in nature. 90 The rationale
for the economic argument is premised on the notion that property rights
will allow an internalization of positive externalities from the production of
creative works 91 and prevent what is conventionally known as the "tragedy
of the commons." 92
87. Although there are traces of utilitarian thinking throughout copyright's history, there is a
strong natural rights argument favoring authors and their labor in producing the work. PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 7 (2001); see also

ROSE, supra note 13, at 38-41 (stating that the most common figure between the author and the
book in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was that between parent and child).
88. Orit Fischmann Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law
Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
497, 504-05 (2004).
89. R.R. Bowker states:
[T]here is nothing which may more rightfully be called property than the creation of
the individual brain. For property (from the Latin proprius, own) means a man's very
own, and there is nothing more his own than the thought, created, made out of no
material thing (unless the nerve-food which the brain consumes in the act of thinking
be so counted), which uses material things only for its record or manifestation. The
best proof of ownership is that if this individual man or woman had not thought this
individual thought, realized in writing or in music or in marble, it would not exist.
BOWKER, supra note 50, at 3.
90. The grant of rights in most common law jurisdictions has been into every situation
where the economic value of the goods can be realized based on the premise that rights are
necessary as an incentive for continued investment in the production and publication of creative
works. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 87, at 8.
91.

ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 638 (2001).

The

application of property theories to copyright is intended to efficiently allocate resources in the
market for creative works. Without these rights, copyright owners will not be able to capture the
full value of their works and some of that value will be lost. If this occurs, then there cannot be
an efficient allocation of resources as users who are willing to pay more for the enjoyment of the
additional value will not be able to do so. See also Netanel, supra note 6, at 314-15.
92. Owners of communal property or property which is a commonly owned will diminish
the value of the property as each person will tend to overuse the property and allow others to bear
the cost of that use. Negotiating an agreement to regulate behavior and police the use of that
property will be high as there are too many people involved in negotiating a mutually satisfactory
agreement. Granting a private right to exclude others from using the property allows the owner to
internalize the benefits and costs of others use of the property. Harold Demsetz, Towards a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347, 359 (1967), available at
http://www.compilerpress.atfreeweb.com/Anno%/20Demsetz%20Property%20Rights.htm.
Professor Demsetz argues that this same analysis applies to copyright: "[i]f a new idea is freely
appropriable by all, if there exist communal rights to new ideas, incentives for developing such
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The difficulty with applying property law ideas to literary and artistic
works is the use of property law ideas on what is essentially intangible.9 3
Protecting land from being overused is worlds apart from protecting
expressions in art, music, and plays that are free for everyone to use. The
difference between land and creative works lie primarily in the fact that
creative works are not prone to depletion or over use. Unlike land or other
resources that property law aims to protect, creative expressions are neither
limited nor finite resources.94 In fact, increased usage of creative works in
the public domain produces new forms of works rather than depletes
them.95 As ideas build upon other ideas, having fewer restrictions on the
use of literary and artistic works is beneficial.9 6 Allowing some form of
ideas will be lacking. The benefits derivable from these ideas will not be concentrated on their
originators. If we extend some degree of private rights to the originators, these ideas will come
forth at a more rapid pace." Id. at 359.
93. Professor Carrier explains that "[a]s a public good, information is nonexclusive and
nonrivalrous. Nonexclusivity prevents others from the possession of information (in contrast to
tangible property, for which physical restraints often are sufficient)." Nonrivalrousness on the
other hand, means that "one person's consumption does not diminish the amount of the good for
others to consume-that is multiple persons can use the information without depleting it."
Michael Carrier, CabiningIntellectualProperty Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L. J. 1,
32 (2004).
94. Ideas released to the world are generally free. Indeed the recipient of an idea receives
instruction without lessening that of the instructor and the person who lights his taper at one
person, receives light without darkening the other. LESSIG,supra note 57, at 58 (quoting Thomas
Jefferson).
95. New works are always being formed from existing works. Professor Jessica Litman
conceives:
[C]omposers recombine sounds they have heard before; playwrights base their
characters on bits and pieces drawn from real human beings and other playwrights'
characters; novelists draw their plots from lives and other plots within their experience;
software writers use the logic they find in other software; lawyers transform old
arguments to fit new facts; cinematographers, actors, choreographers, architects, and
sculptors all engage in the process of adapting, transforming, and recombining what is
already "out there" in some other form.
Jessica Litman, The PublicDomain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 966-67 (1990).
96. Professor Benjamin Kaplan in his 1966 James Carpentier Lecture in Columbia Law
School mentions the need for adequate public access to works. He states that at the time the
lecture was given:
[S]elf-interest on the part of authors and publishers has usually resulted in adequate
public access to works, and the law had rarely had to become insistent. Probably the
law of the future will lose patience rather quickly with the mere idiosyncratic
withholding of access. But I should hope there will ever be play for the humane
development of the "moral rights" of authors to prevent abuses in the exploitation of
their creations. This will indeed be especially important if copyright itself recedes as a
significant control ... I am suggesting that copyright or the larger part of its controls
will appear unneeded, merely obstructive, as applied to certain sectors of production
and that here [the electronic system for scholarly production] will lapse into disuse and
may disappear.
KAPLAN, supra note 71, at 120-21.
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positive externalities to exist benefits the communal pool of creative
resources far greater than if property law was extended to allow for the full
internalization of creative resources, if that is at all possible. 97 Copyright's
intellectual trajectory has always been a quest for some limitations to
property rights over creative works because the monopoly created from the
grant of property rights creates a barrier to the accessibility of these works
and denies the public the opportunity to use these works.9 8 This balance
between private rights and public interests imposes a continuous
responsibility on law and policy makers to ensure that rights owners are
able to recover their investment in the production of the work and that the
public is not denied access
to these works through the overly restrictive
99
rights.
these
of
exercise
97. Some form of positive externalities will always be free for the public use and cannot be
internalized. Professor Mark Lemley suggests:
[T]he effort to permit inventors to capture the full social value of their invention-and

the rhetoric of free riding in intellectual property more generally-are fundamentally
misguided. In no other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of
social benefits. Competitive markets work not because producers capture the full social
value of their output-they do not except at the margin-but because they permit
producers to make enough money to cover their costs, including a reasonable return on
fixed-cost investment. Even real property doesn't give property owners the right to
control social value. Various uses of property create uncompensated positive
externalities, and we don't see that as a problem or a reason people won't efficiently
invest in their property. Analogously, I argue that full internalization of positive
externalities is not a proper goal of tangible property rights except in unusual
circumstances, for several reasons: (1) there is no need to fully internalize benefits in
intellectual property; (2) efforts to capture positive externalities may actually reduce
them, leaving everyone worse off; and (3) the effort to capture such externalities invite
rent-seeking.
Lemley, supra note 7, at 1032.
98.

Justice Holmes in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. comments that the

rights in copyright should only be endured for only as long as necessary. 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908)
He states:

[I]n copyright property has reached a more abstract expression. The right to exclude is
not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo, so to speak. It
restraints the spontaneity of men, where but for it, there would be nothing of any kind
to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition on conduct remote from the
persons or tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand miles
from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of the wrong. It is a right which
could not be recognized or endured for more than a limited time and therefore, I may
remark in passing, it is one which hardly can be conceived except as a product of
statute ....
Id.

99. In fact, Professor Shubha Ghosh, in discussing the government's privatization of
cultural production through copyright and the need to deprivatize copyright so that cultural
production serves the public good states that,
[T]he historical evidence ... illustrates that copyright has never been a purely private
right. Copyright debates, from the inception of copyright in early English history to
the political and legal battles over international copyright in the United States, have
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In this article, I suggest that creative authorship rather than economic
investment should be the basis for the grant of property rights over the
work. The grant of these rights to authors by virtue of the act of creativity
and process of authorship will free works from being commodities that will
generate revenue to cover the cost of printing and publishing them.' 00
Property rights will facilitate and encourage authorship, creativity, and the
production of new creative works when they are granted as a reward for the
creative act of imagining and expressing one's thoughts, ideas and beliefs.
Authorship for the benefit of society is the central concern in the private
rights-public interest debate in copyright and the grant of a property right
in a work must ensure that the monopoly over the uses of the work is a
temporary one that will benefit society. By recognizing the rights over the
work as belonging to the person who authored the work, the law will
effectively address the public interest component of the copyright debate
by removing works from the collectivism of the commercial marketplace
and putting the rights of control on the autonomous individual author, who
produced the work through the availability and accessibility of other works
in the public domain. 10 1 In other words, property rights granted as a result
of authorship recognizes an author's relationship and responsibility towards
his readers and removes a work from being an income-generating market

always pitted pnvate rights and interests against public values ... the record does not
support copyright's status as a purely private right secured by the government.
Shubha Ghosh, DeprivatizingCopyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 387, 428 (2003).
100. Professor Jaszi makes the comment:
[T]he terminology of the "work," denominating a free-standing abstraction as the
subject of literary property, emerged only in the mid-eighteenth century through
In the immediate sense, this
judicial elaboration of the statutory framework.
development was one consequence of the commercialization and commodification of
Active
print culture that proceeded apace throughout the eighteenth century.
commerce in use-rights in literary property separate from physical manuscripts
themselves, eventually called forth the new terminology. In effect, the 'work' was the
commodity form or objectification of the "author's" labor, and the publisher was able
to realize the surplus value of that labor.
Jaszi, supra note 27, at 473-74.
101. By doing this, there will be significant changes in the market for creative and literary
works. Romantic authorship, embodying the values of "individual self-proprietorship, creative
autonomy, and artistic originality" had "initially facilitated the development of a commodity
market in intellectual productions" but this idea "had the potential to interfere with the further
development and smooth functioning of that market." Id. at 501. To Professor Jaszi:
As such, "authorship" may not so much facilitate commodification as impede it. Thus, the
overall incoherence of the law's account of "authorship" may be best understood as
reflecting a continuing struggle between the economic forces that (at least in the abstract)
would be best served by the further depersonalization of creative endeavor and the
ideological persistence of an increasingly inefficient version of individualism.
Id. at 501-2.
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commodity to allow owners their recovery of publication and distribution
costs.
A stronger case for property rights over literary and artistic works can
be made for the author's relationship with society and his responsibility
towards his readers than the economic justifications for recovery of
investment discussed here for several reasons. The first reason is that the
concern that property rights will put creative works in the control of a few
individuals or entities' ° 2 will be less pronounced where property rights are
granted for authorship and creativity because an author realizes the need to
have access to other forms of creative works for inspiration, ideas and
guidance and are less driven by the need to recover investments made in
the production of the work. 10 3 Second, authors are less likely to seek a full
internalization of positive externalities precisely because they have
benefited from another author's work and are more inclined than the
corporate copyright owner to understand the desirability of allowing some
forms of externalities to be free for the benefit of society.' 04 Third,
102. The maximization of intellectual property rights and the exercise of those rights in the
most extreme and restrictive way is a reminiscence of European feudalism in the middle ages.
Professor Lessig explains:
[U]nder feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
individuals and entitles. And not only were the rights that ran with that property
powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a strong interest in assuring that
property holders within that system not weaken feudalism by liberating people or
property within their control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum
control and concentration. It fought and freedom that might interfere with that control
... this is precisely the choice we are now making about intellectual property. We will
have an information society. That much is certain. Our only choice now is whether
that information society will be free or feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
LESSIG, supra note 15, at 267.
103. New authors are potentially copiers of existing works and are those who feel the impact
of strict copyright laws as materials needed to create new works are protected by the laws of
copyright under the present system. Professor Waldron argues:
[A]n institution like intellectual property is not selfjustifying; we owe ajustification to
anyone who finds that he can move less freely than he would in the absence of the
institution. So... although the copiers may be denigrated as unoriginal plagiarists or
thieves of others' work, still they are the ones who feel the immediate impact of our
intellectual property laws. It affects what they may do, how they may speak, and how
they may earn a living. Of course nothing is settled by saying that It is their interests
that are particularly at stake; if the tables were turned, we should want to highlight the
perspective of the authors. But as things stand, the would-be copiers are the ones to
whom a justification of intellectual property is owed.
Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Vales in Intellectual
Property,68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 842, 887 (1993)
104. Professor Lemley speaks of the undesirability of internalizing all positive externalities.
He states:
The assumption that intellectual property owners should be entitled to capture the full
social surplus of their invention runs counter to our economic intuitions in every other
segment of the economy. We do not permit producers to capture the full social value
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property rights in creative works are more likely to achieve an efficient
allocation of resources when the rights are granted to authors who, through
the process of authorship, are more likely to recognize the necessity for the
that the work falls to
temporary nature of the property right so as to10ensure
5
expires.
right
the
as
soon
as
domain
the public
Property rights in literary and artistic works of a temporary nature are
an ingenious way to ensure the production of creative works for the public.
Unless we are inclined to rely on a state subsidized patronage system for
the production of creative works, the property rights system is an ideal way
to ensure that literary and artistic works are produced for society's growth
and development. 10 6 The property rights system has been criticized for the
precise reason that these rights may be used to erect fences that prevent
public use of the works and create excessive control over how these works
are used. 10 7 The justification for fences and control is often an economic
one-that there is a need to protect the investment that has been made to
produce the work, or else the public will use the work in an inefficient way,
creating a disincentive for creative production. 0 8 By shifting the grant of
of their output. Nor do we permit the owners even of real property to internalize the
full positive externalities associated with their property... [t]he very idea that the law
should find a way to internalize these positive externalities seems faintly preposterous.
Positive externalities are everywhere. We couldn't internalize them all even if we
wanted to. Areeda and Hovenkamp offer numerous examples of uncompensated
positive externalities. They conclude that "free riding on the positive externalities
created by others is everywhere, and society does little to eliminate it." And as noted
above, there is no reason we should particularly want to do so. If "free riding" means
merely obtaining a benefit from another's investment, the law does not, cannot, and
should not prohibit it. If the marginal social cost of benefiting from a use is zero,
prohibiting that use imposes unnecessary social costs.
Lemley, supra note 7, at 1046-49.
105. The property right in creative works is therefore not a right that exists due to scarcity in
resources and the need to protect these resources from over use. Id. at 1055. Temporary in
nature, the right in literary and artistic works "is a conscious decision to create scarcity in a type
of good in which it is ordinarily absent in order to artificially boost the economic returns to
innovation." Id.
106. Authors did not own their work under the patronage system of the early modem period.
ROSE, supra note 13, at 16-17. They provided services of honor and status to their patron, who in
turn provided them with material and immaterial rewards. Id.
107. Professor James Boyle calls the expansion of intellectual property rights "the second
enclosure movement." James Boyle, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (2003). It comes after
the first enclosure movement, in which fences were built around common property to convert it
into private property from the fifteenth century up until the nineteenth century in England. Id. at
34 n.2. Referring to the second movement as the "enclosure of the intangible commons of the
mind," Professor Boyle lists many reasons for expansion of intellectual property rights, including
"innovation, efficiency, traditional values, the boundaries of the market, the saving of lives [and]
the loss of familiar liberties," and states that "[o]nce again, opposition to enclosure is portrayed as
economically illiterate; the beneficiaries of enclosure telling us that an expansion of intellectual
property rights is needed in order to fuel progress." Id. at 37-41.
108. Professor Boyle states:
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property rights to the individual author, arguments for fences and excessive
control are no longer valid because the precise nature of authorship is
dependent on having access to works and being able to use existing works
in new ones. Recognizing authorship as the basis for the grant of the
property right in creative works puts authors in better connection with their
readers and will create a more balanced relationship between the grant of
private rights and public interests.
C. Readers and the Public Interests

Professor Paul Goldstein, in a 1992 article, speaks of authorship as an
encompassing concept that brings both an author and his audience or reader
within its embrace. 10 9 The author must have an audience to communicate
his work, tell his story, play his music and express his personality. Without
this important component in the copyright equation, the author's incentive
to create will not be complete. 10 An author's recognition for his works
come from an audience and the grant of a property right in his work for his
authorship can only make sense when the rewards for his labor flow from
those he had written for."' Professor Goldstein states three conditions that
It may sound paradoxical, but in a very real sense protection of the commons was one
of the fundamental goals of intellectual property law. In the new vision of intellectual
property, however, property should be extended everywhere-more is better.
Expanding patentable and copyrightable subject matter, lengthening the copyright
term, giving legal protection to "digital barbed wire" even if it is used in part to protect
against fair use: Each of these can be understood as a vote of no confidence in the
productive power of the commons. We seem to be shifting from Brandeis's
assumption that the 'noblest of human production are free as the air to common use' to
the assumption that any commons is inefficient, if not tragic.
id at 40.
109. To Professor Goldstein:
Copyright, in a word, is about authorship. Copyright is about sustaining the conditions
of creativity that enable an individual to craft out of thin air, and intense devouring
labor, an Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen Kane. Copyright is as much
about the pages of deleted text, the scenes that lie on the cutting room floor, as it is
about the refined work, the final cut, that ultimately reaches the author's public. But
copyright-and authorship-are only in part about the act of creation. If creation is all
there was to authorship, copyright could comfortably leave the author scribbling alone
in his far-off garret. Authorship in its contemporary sense implies not just an author,
but an audience; not just words spoken, but individuals spoken to.
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and Legislation: The Kastenmeier Years, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

79, 80 (1992).
110. Professor Goldstein explains that there is more to creation than "an author scribbling
alone in his far-off garret." Id. In fact, "[aluthorship in its contemporary sense implies not just an
author, but an audience; not just words but individuals spoken to." Id.
111. Authorship to Professor Goldstein indicates a relationship between authors and readers.
He states:
By authorship, I mean authors communicating as directly as circumstance allows with
their intended audiences. Copyright sustains the very heart and essence of authorship
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must coincide for authorship in its modem form to flourish between an
author and his readers." 2 The first condition is the technology that must
exist to bring an author's work to his desired readers."l 3 Gutenberg's
printers were the earliest technology to make the author-reader relationship
possible. l 14 The connectivity of the Internet today makes this connection
stronger and wider as authors and readers are connected online without the
constraints of reproduction costs and geographical boundaries. 1 5 The
second condition for authorship to flourish is a political environment in
which no sovereign entity impedes the communication between the author
and his intended audience." 16 The development of civil society discourse
and freedom of speech today are far removed from the monopolies and
licensing control of governments in England and continental Europe in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Early copyright statutes removed
literary and artistic works from government control and today, copyright
has been conceived as an institution that supports democratic culture and
creative expression. ' 17 The third condition that will allow authorship to
by enabling this communication, this connection. It is copyright that makes it possible
for audiences-markets-to form for an author's work, and it is copyright that makes
it possible for publishers to bnng these works to market. Id.
112. To Professor Goldstein, the author's audience are those "whom the power of his vision
can command." Id. at 81.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Much of the Internet's potential to connect people, including authors and readers, may
remain to be discovered. Professor Lessig speaks of the difficulty of predicting how the Internet
will develop and states:
The architects who created the first protocols of the Net had not sense of a world
where grandparents would use computers to keep in touch with their grandkids. They
had no idea of a technology where every song imaginable is available within thirty
seconds' reach. The World Wide Web (WWW) was the fantasy of a few MIT
computer scientists. The perpetual tracking of preferences that allows a computer in
Washington State to suggest an artist I might like because of a book I just purchased
was an idea that no one had made famous before the Internet made it real . .. [y]et
there are elements of this future that we can fairly imagine. They are the consequences
of failing costs, and hence falling barriers to creativity. The most dramatic are the
changes in the cost of distribution; but just as important are the changes in the cost of
production. Both are the consequences of going digital: digital technologies create and
replicate reality more efficiently than nondigital technology does. This will mean a
world of change.
LESSIG, supra note 57, at 7.
116. Goldstein, supra note 109, at 81.
117. Professor Netanel states:
Copyright is a limited proprietary entitlement through which the state deliberately and
selectively employs market institutions to support a democratic civil society.
Copyright law provides this support in two fundamental ways. First, through its
production function, copyright encourages creative expression on a wide array of
political, social and aesthetic issues. The activity of creating and communicating such
expression and the expression itself constitutes vital components of a democratic civil

20081

AUTHORS AND READERS

flourish is an economic system that facilitates direct communication
between authors and readers." 8 Markets for literary and artistic works
determine the strength of this connection between authors and readers. A
market driven by what an author's readers would like to read, listen and
watch provides an author's reward for his labor, and in turn creates the
necessary incentive for him to produce new literary and artistic works. ''9
The opportunities for true authorship to flourish in today's digital
economy are plentiful, primarily because of the connection authors now
have with their readers and their ability to reproduce and distribute works
at marginal cost. Professor Kaplan in 1966 spoke of technologies that
would allow downstream users of copyrighted materials to be billed for
exact uses of copyrighted materials with the precise royalties paid to the
respective copyright owners. 2 ° More recently in Copyright's Highway,
Professor Goldstein with the same foresight, identified the metaphorical
celestial jukebox that performs similar functions of connecting authors and
their readers in an interactive way, so that readers may choose the works

society. Second, through its structural function, copyright serves to further the
democratic character of public discourse. By according authors and their assigns a
proprietary entitlement, copyright fosters the development of an independent sector for
the creation and dissemination of original expression, a sector composed of creators
and publishers who earn financial support for their activities by reaching paying
audiences rather than by depending on state or elite largess.
Netanel, supra note 6, at 347.
118. Goldstein, supra note 109, at 81.
119. Connecting authors with their readers is the ultimate aim of copyright. Professor
Goldstein conceives the digital world as perfecting the author-reader relationship. He states in his
conclusion to his book, Copyright's Highway:
The digital future is the next, and perhaps ultimate, phase in copyright's long
trajectory, perfecting the law's early aim of connecting authors to their audiences, free
from interference by political sovereigns or the will of patrons. The main challenges
will be to keep this trajectory clear of the buffets of protectionism and true to
copyright's historic logic that the best prescription for connecting authors to their
audiences is to extend rights into every corner where consumers derive value from
literary and artistic works.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 236 (1994).
120. Professor Kaplan speaks of "secondary and later exploitations" of creative works that
will be done through applied systems:
The ingenuity which devises the systems will no doubt be capable of welding-in
bookkeeping apparatus that can continue for the whole copyright period to bill the
customers monthly or weekly with exact copyright charges per work used, as well as
with system tolls, and then to make precise royalty remittances to the copyright
owners. . . what is suggested, on more sober reflection, is methods by which large
repertories of works will be made available for a great variety of uses, and charges and
remittances figured on a rough-and-ready basis, all with liberal application of some
principle of "clearance at the source" to prevent undue bother down the line to the final
consumer.
KAPLAN, supra note 71, at 120-21.
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they want and pay the price for the work's worth. 12 1 The online streaming
of music today is a classic example of what was envisioned in years before.
Rhapsody, for example, is a membership based music service that allows
music listeners to access millions of songs, get personalized music
suggestions tailored to their tastes and transfer their music to portable
music players for a monthly fee. 22 Apple's iTunes store creates a digital
entertainment superstore online with as many as 6 million songs, 100,000
podcasts, 30,000 audio books, 600 TV shows, 500 movies and iPod
games. 123 These services provide a copyright user with choices that were
never possible before creative works were digitized and put on the Internet,
thereby creating opportunities for better and stronger connections between
authors and their audiences.
Digital technologies have also provided readers with an opportunity to
participate in the authorship process that was never before possible, but
which now facilitates a greater connection between the author and his
readers. Movie edits by fans and audiences through digital technologies
indicate a desire on the part of the public to connect with their authors.
Previously, the only way an author obtained an idea of what his readers
wanted was through the sales of his works in the market. 124 Fan edits of the
Phantom Menace of the new Star Wars movies 125 and the Purist Edit of the

121. Professor Goldstein states:
The metaphor that best expresses the possibilities of the future is the celestial jukebox,
a technology-packed satellite orbiting thousands of miles above earth, awaiting a
subscriber's order-like a nickel in the old jukebox, and the punch of a button-to
connect him to any number of selections from a vast storehouse via a home or office
receiver that combines the power of a television set, radio, CD player, VCR, telephone,
fax, and personal computer.
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY, supra note 119, at 199.
122. See Rhapsody FAQs, http://www.rhapsody.com/rhapsody-faqs (last visited Oct. 6,
2007).
123. See iTunes Store, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
124. Professor Goldstein explains this point by stating:
Authors and publishers will direct their efforts and their resources toward those
audiences that will pay for their works. Whenever Congress withholds a right from a
particular market, allowing free use, it effectively shuts off the most effective means of
communication between an author and her audience-the price mechanism. Assured
of exclusive rights in some markets-the theatrical and television motion pictures
markets, for example-authors and producers will shape their works to the tastes of
theater and television audiences. Denied rights in other markets-the home videotape
rental market, for example-authors and producers have no reason to aim their efforts
at the possibly quite different tastes of audiences in these markets. To the extent that
the tastes of audiences that get the work free diverge from the tastes of those who pay,
the variety of works overall will diminish, as will authorship generally.
Goldstein, supra note 109, at 83-84.
125. See The Phantom Edit, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThePhantomEdit (last visited Oct.
6, 2007).
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Two Towers of the Lord of the Rings movie trilogy 126 have, however,
communicated audience preferences to movie producers George Lucas and
Peter Jackson in a manner that is only possible because of digital
technologies in the market. Garageband.com, an online music hosting site
for independent musicians, allows music listeners to review music that is
uploaded on the site, and to influence the way in which music is discovered
and promoted by reviewing new127songs. Songs with the highest reviews are
played on the air over the radio.
Greater author-reader connection through technologies that are
available today facilitates greater authorship in a more vibrant copyright
market than was possible before. The public interest in creative works can
be better served when authors are sufficiently connected to their readers 1to
28
produce creative works that their readers want and are willing to pay for.
The incentives under the law are designed to encourage authorship and to
benefit the public by ensuring that authors produce works that their readers
want. 129 Property rights over creative works provide authors some
necessary control over uses of their works so that they are able to obtain the
market rewards that come with the production of creative and literary
works that appeal to their readers. 130 Many provisions of copyright
facilitate the engagement between authors and readers and allow
authorship-a process between conceiving an idea for a work and finally
handing the work over to an author's readers-to occur.' 31 This connection
126. See The Two Towers: The Purist Edit, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TheTwoTowers:
_ThePuristEdit (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
127. See Garageband, http://www.garageband.com/review (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
128. The consumers ultimately decide what will be published. Goldstein, supra note 109, at
82.
129. These rights under the law are important because they provide authors with a connection
to their readers through the price that readers are willing to pay for the work. Professor Goldstein
points this out by stating:
Uncontrolled use in new markets not only can deprive producers of the revenues they
need to continue doing their work but may also muffle the signals they need to hear
about popular preference. No one, not even the most ardent copyright pessimist, has
sought to rebut the argument that the production and consumption of information are
connected, and that there is no better way for the public to indicate what they are
willing to pay in the marketplace. Uncompensated use inevitably dilutes these signals.
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY, supra note 119, at 216-17.

130. To Professor Goldstein:
Free markets for goods and free markets for ideas are closely, in not perfectly,
entwined. Copyright has historically mediated between the two . . . with the great
revolutions of the eighteenth century came the political freedom and the commercial
markets that, together with cheap printing, for the first time ensured writers that their
work, their ideas, and their livelihood could be committed to the marketplace.
Id. at 232.
131. Digital technologies will reduce the role that printers and publishers have in the
copyright market, and allow for a more direct connection between authors and their readers.
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between authors and readers that allows an author to produce a work that
his readers most want to see is an ideal that if attained through the
copyright system, will create an abundance of literary and artistic works
that will benefit society as a whole. 132 This however depends on whether
the law allows for the connection between authors and readers and if it
does, whether the free economic market for literary and artistic works will
allow authorship to flourish for the benefit of society.

III. Digital Technologies and Authorship
Perhaps the most significant impact of digital technologies on the
landscape for literary and artistic production is the development of a
networked economy, which allowed digital, as opposed to analog
content, 133 to be distributed to infinite points across the network and at
marginal cost. 13 4 The emergence of digital technologies has changed
thinking on the law in significant ways. First, new technologies have made
the processes of access, use and making copies of a work virtually
indistinguishable, thus giving rise to new questions of authorship and
extent of rights. 135 The second change in copyright thinking lies in the
application of law and economics jurisprudence, which has conventionally
been used to further understanding of particular ideas within the law, such
as the fair use exception, to new situations of author-reader relationships
Professor Goldstein rightfully points out that "tomorrow's author, artist, or composer who has
access to a networked computer-most will-can bypass not only these corporate entities but
also libraries and retail outlets, to communicate directly with his intended audience." Id. at 235.
132. To Professor Goldstein, extending nghts into "every comer where consumers derive
value from literary and artistic works" will "promote political as well as cultural diversity,
ensuring a plenitude of voices, all with the chance to be heard." Id at 236.
133. An analog world is described as the representation of our sensations in the real world.
Professor Vaidhyanathan explains:
We live in an analog world. The sensations we experience are manipulations of light
and matter, interpreted by our organs and mind as waves. These waves have several
aspects to them, most significantly frequency and amplitude. When someone plucks a
guitar string, her finger vibrates the string, the string vibrates the air, and the air
vibrates our eardrums. We can represent the pluck in many ways, including a drop of
ink on music staff paper. This is analog representation.
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS,
PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 151 (2001).

THE RISE

OF INTELLECTUAL

134. Id. at 152.
135. Professor Vaidhyanathan believes:
Copyright was designed to regulate only copying. It was not supposed to regulate
one's rights to read or share. But now that the distinctions among accessing, using,
and copying have collapsed, copyright policy makers have found themselves faces
with what seems to be a difficult choice: either relinquish some control over copying
or expand copyright to regulate access and use, despite the chilling effect this might
have on creativity, community and democracy.
Id. at 152-53.
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over the Internet. 136 Third, new technologies have also provided authors
with the ability to control and monitor uses of their work, and to exclude
usages and access to the work by their readers in ways that were not
foreseen by the law. 137 Authorship and the relationship between authors
and readers will be reshaped by the emergence and possibilities of new
technologies and it is important that the law provide the environment where
authorship and the relationship between authors and readers can flourish to
ensure the continuous production of literary and artistic works for the
public.
A. Transaction Costs for Negotiating Use
The central theme in this article, the need to recognize authors as the
property right owner of literary and artistic works, places authorship at the
core of copyright protection. Authors, by virtue of their act of creation and
authorship, should be entitled to protection under the very body of law that
is designed to facilitate creative endeavors as opposed to economic
investments. The grant of rights to authors acknowledges that the very act
of creativity builds upon works of others and therefore recognizes access to
existing works by other authors as an important component of the law that
cannot be overlooked. The grant of property rights through the copyright
system operates as a mechanism to lower transaction costs. As rights are
defined, market negotiations for the use of a work become possible. 38
These property rights are necessary in a world where transaction costs
make contractual negotiations with every possible reader of an author's
work impossible.139 Where transaction costs for negotiating a license are
136. Such as the potential for corporate censorship and the problems that will arise from a
close monitor of the different uses of a work under the "Celestial Jukebox" metaphor. Id. at 158.
137. Professor Lessig comments:
[T]rusted systems regulate in the same domain where copyright law regulates, but
unlike copyright law, they do not guarantee the same public use protection. Trusted
systems give the producer maximum control-admittedly at a cheaper cost, thus
permitting many more authors to publish. But they give authors more control (either
to charge for or limit use) in an area where the law gave less than perfect control.
Code displaces the balance in copyright law and doctrines such as fair use.
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 70, at 135.

138. Professor Sag explains that property rights are used to lower transaction costs and that
property rights, introduced into a legal regime, are sometimes the "lowest transaction cost
solution." Markets, to Professor Sag, will operate more efficiently with property rights. Matthew
J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal
Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 209 (2006).
139. If transaction costs did not present a difficulty, then it would be possible to negotiate
contracts with every possible reader in the absence of copyright. Professor Sag speaks of a truly
Coasian world without transaction costs or market inefficiencies and states that in such a world:
[T]here would be no reason to assume that any level of copyright scope was superior.
The reason for this is that if there are literally no transaction costs, an author can
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low, the grant of property rights in works does not create barriers for
accessibility to new authors because new authors are able to enter
negotiations with previous authors for the use of their works, particularly
With digital
when the Internet facilitates these negotiations. 140
technologies, there is a better chance for authorship to flourish and for
authors to be better connected with their readers so that works of literary
and artistic value that are produced benefit society. The rights granted as
property provide this incentive for creative production as authors obtain
rewards for their labor from their readers and new authors are able to
negotiate the rights to use existing works for the creation of new works
precisely because of the lowered transaction costs for negotiations that are
created by the Internet.
The grant of property rights in creative works, however, comes with
some social costs, one of which is the refusal to allow the use of works for
new ones and the existence of monopolies if works are priced much higher
than the marginal cost of production, resulting in a transfer of resources
from readers back to authors.' 4 1 The possibility of deadweight losses from
monopoly pricing is also very real when property rights are granted in
creative works. 142 However, monopolies in creative works are fairly
uncommon because of the substitutability of creative works for one
another. Professor Goldstein correctly pointed out that readers of a novel
would migrate to other works if an author's publisher were to set the book
at a substantially higher price. 143 In fact, the radio industry found music to

contract with the whole world
endeavors-she does not need
harm in a zero-transaction-cost
contract with copyright owners

to obtain their assurance of sufficient rewards for her
copyright. Similarly, broad copyright scope does no
world because second generation authors can always
for any rights they need.

Id.
140. Professor Trotter Hardy explains that the Internet lowers transaction costs in three
ways-first, the cost of communication between people, second, the cost of computer recording
of transaction data and third, the communication costs facilitating institutional innovations like
rights clearing houses. Cyberspace, to Professor Hardy, operates to connect people in a way that
they would not have connected before and as a result, this lowers transaction costs where it would
have been extraordinarily high before. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace,
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 237 (1996).
141. The exclusive period wherein only the owner of a copyright has control over the work
may create potential monopolies. To Professor Carrier:
[1]n this way the right to exclude may provide incentives by allowing the recovery of
expenditures and profits, it may also (to the extent that other products are imperfect
substitutes for the protected invention) allow inventors to charge a price significantly
above the marginal cost of production. IP holders thus could reap monopoly profits,
effectuating a transfer of resource from consumers.
Carrier, supra note 93, at 45.
142. Id.
143. Professor Goldstein states:
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be highly substitutable works when the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) raised their licensing fees in 1940.144
Works from the public domain were broadcasted as a retaliation against the
higher licensing fees and "race" and "hillbilly" music, thought to be of
lesser value then, were accepted by music listeners and eventually evolved
45
to the genres of soul and country music that are known today.
Technologies have also developed that allow for authors to price
discriminate perfectly and therefore avoid deadweight loss problems in the
market, allowing readers, who are willing to pay more for the work to
purchase a different package from readers, who are less inclined to spend
46
as much. 1

The grant of property rights to authors is unlikely to present a severe
challenge to negotiating rights for the use of existing works in the creation
of new works. New authors are, in most situations, able to communicate
with other authors and seek permission to use their works. This is
particularly so when technologies have made the cost of negotiations for
the use of rights or transaction costs marginal. The availability of
standardized licenses that state what others can and cannot do with a work
also contribute significantly to a more conducive environment whereby
authors may communicate with each other to seek the necessary permission
to use each other's work. 147 As transaction costs are so low, the grant of
property rights in creative and literary works does not create a barrier to
accessibility to existing works, especially when the person from whom
permission is sought is another author. In situations where transaction
costs are high, fair use will provide a solution that allows authors to use
works without seeking prior permission.
[O]ne author's expression will always be substitutable for another's. Were Elmore
Leonard's publisher imprudent enough to charge $75 for a copy of his latest work, I
expect Leonard would soon see many of his readers migrate to works, perhaps of
James Ellroy at $19.95, not to speak of paperback reprints of the classics-Chandler,
Hammet and Cain at $4.95.
Goldstein, supranote 109, at 84.
144.
145.

PAUL S. CARPENTER, MUSIC: AN ART AND A BUSINESS 111 (1950).
JOHN RYAN, THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 1 (1985).

146. Trusted systems have developed to allow price discrimination for literary and artistic
works. Professor Lessig explains this system:
[Y]ou could get access, say, to the New York Times and pay a different pnce
depending on how much of it you read. The Times could determine how much you
read, whether you could copy portions of the newspaper, whether you could save it to
your hard disc and so on. But if the code you used to access the Times site did not
enable the control the Times demanded, then the Times would not let you onto its site
at all.
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 70, at 129.

147. See, e.g., Creative Commons licenses, available at http://creativecommons.org/license/
(last visited April 4, 2008).
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B. Fair Use and Authorship
Fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act allows limitations upon the
property right in circumstances where the use of the work is regarded to be
a fair use. Where the use of the work is for such purposes as "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research," 148 the use is
not regarded as infringing upon copyright. Professor Wendy Gordon has
argued that the fair use provision is really a mechanism employed by the
courts to affect a market transfer when consensual bargains between the
copyright holder and the user may not occur through the market because
the market fails to allocate resources efficiently. 149 Professor Gordon's
argument is an exceedingly compelling one. In many situations, market
failures occur, especially in markets for literary and artistic works. In these
markets, costs and benefits are often not internalized, perfect knowledge
may not be attainable and the presence of transaction costs could all cause a
When the
market to fail in allowing consensual bargains to occur."5
market fails to allow public dissemination of works through consensual
bargains, fair use operates to allow a user to depart from using the
mechanisms of the market place to negotiate rights for the use of the work.
Where three conditions are present-market failure, social desirability in
allowing use and the absence of substantial injury to the copyright ownerfair use is justified.'51
The application of fair use in this digital age may be difficult. Using
Professor Gordon's test, fair use may not be applied in a situation where
The Internet and digital
consensual bargains may take place. 152
technologies, however, have corrected many of the failings in the market
for literary and artistic works by connecting authors and their readers in
unprecedented ways. An author's fans know much more about the author
of their favorite work through the information available on the Internet.
Authors are often contactable through e-mail addresses listed on their web
pages. Fair use has a very limited role to play on the Internet because the
technologies, which so ably connect authors with their readers allow for
contractual negotiations to take place. Far from the market failing to reach
socially desirable transfers and allocation of rights, the Internet has
produced an almost perfectly efficient market for literary and artistic
works. The fair use justification for denying an author his rights in the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure,supra note 17.
Id. at 1607-08.
Id. at 1614.
Id. at 1615.
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work does not apply when technologies allow for efficient negotiations to
take place between authors.
Outside the Internet, however, fair use has a vital role to play in
ensuring future generations of authors are able to have access to creative
works. Where authors are not able to communicate through new
technologies, it becomes important that there is a mechanism in the law,
which allows an author to use works without infringing the rights of
another author. The need to have some form of "implied consent"'' 53 to the
use of the work in situations where the author would have consented if
perfect market conditions had existed' 54 is particularly important in
situations when transaction costs for negotiating rights are too high.
Education materials are an example. Premier educational institutions have
materials that are needed by educators around the globe, where connection
with the author to negotiate rights may be impossible and transaction costs
insurmountable. The success of the MIT Open Courseware indicates a
genuine need for educational materials that are made available to other
educators, who may not have access to the necessary technologies to
engage in consensual bargains with other educators. 155
Justice Stevens, in delivering the decision of Sony Corp. ofAmerica v.
Universal City Studios, 56 states a presumption of future harm to the
copyright owner if a use of a work is for commercial purposes1 57 in the
court's determination of "the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work." 158 The presumption is a fair one
because uses of a work for commercial purposes carve out a portion of a
copyright holder's market entitlement and negotiating rights to use the
work are a socially desirable manner of allocating resources in a
commercial market. However, when a work is used for non-commercial
purposes, Justice Stevens suggests a presumption against harm to the
copyright holder and the likelihood of harm must be demonstrated by the
copyright holder.1 59 There may be a viable reason to also presume that
when a work is used for purposes of education, the use is a fair one. The
market for literary and artistic works, particularly for education purposes,
may not provide the necessary mechanisms to allow consensual bargains to

153. Id. at 1616-17.
154. Id. at 1616.
155. MIT OpenCourseWare has an average one million visits per month and 500,000
translations.
See MIT OpenCourseWare, http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/web/home/home/
index.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
156. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
157. Id. at451.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
159. Sony, 468 U.S. at 417.
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take place between authors and readers. The harm to authors by the use of
a work in an educational setting is minimal and social welfare is served by
the fair use doctrine as an exception to the author's exclusive control over
his work. Where transaction costs are prohibitive to allow for the transfer
of rights between authors and readers, fair use as a legal doctrine is the
most suitable tool we have to provide the mechanism that allows for access
to works.
C. Author's Control Through Technologies
Through technologies, authors have perfect control over their works.
Their ability to price discriminate and control the manner in which their
works are used and accessed through trusted systems allow for almost
perfect markets for literary and artistic works to exist. The property rights
in works allow authors the exclusive control over how their works are used;
and the limited application of fair use to situations where the Internet does
create almost perfect markets with low transaction costs may create barriers
to access by other authors if the author decides to withhold permission. In
fact, Professor Vaidhyanathan sees the celestial jukebox metaphor as
creating unlimited potential for corporate censorship. 160 The ability of
authors to control uses of their works provides many opportunities for
works to be disseminated to as wide a readership as an author would like
and encourages a more vibrant and active authorship process by connecting
authors to their readers. Technological development has progressed so
much that authorship today has a completely different meaning than
authorship before. However, there is also a possible setback from the use
of technology by authors in their creative endeavors and in their
relationship with the public-the withholding of access to their works
through technology, price discrimination, censorship and the full exercise
of property right over their works.
Copyright law has an inbuilt mechanism, which may provide a
satisfactory solution to the potential problem of withholding access.
Compulsory licensing provisions in the law allow for transmissions by
cable systems, 16 1 public performances of sound recording,1 62 the making
160. Professor Vaidhyanathan comments:
A highly critical film review or scholarly article demands that the critic or scholar have
the confidence to reuse portions of the original work in the subsequent work. If the
copyright holder wanted to work the Celestial Jukebox more efficiently, it could exact
higher rent for critical use, deny permission entirely, or exact retribution by limiting
access to other works in the future ... the potential for corporate censorship under the
Celestial Jukebox is unlimited.
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 133, at 158.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 11l(d).
162. Id. § 114(2).
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and distributing of phonorecords,163 coin-operated phonorecord players"
and non-commercial broadcasting1 65 to be subjected to publicly
administered rates. These provisions provide for a balance between the
grant of property rights, which provide authors with the exclusive rights
over the work and other authors and the public's rights to have access to
the work. 166 The construct of compulsory licenses, however, is subject to
Article 9 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works 167 that states that authors of literary and artistic works have
the exclusive rights of authorizing the reproduction of their works in any
manner or form. Article 9(2) provides three requirements for national
legislation of members of the Berne union to authorize reproductions-that
the use qualifies as one of "certain special cases," that the reproduction
"not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work" and that the
reproduction "not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the
author."'' 68 If equitable remuneration is granted to the copyright holder, the
requirement of Article 9(2) that a reproduction not69"unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author" will be met. 1
IV. Conclusion: Authors, Readers and the Market for Works
The grant of property rights to copyright owners and not authors in
today's system creates a market for literary and artistic works that does not
encourage the development of authorship and the process of creativity
needed for the production of works for the public. The ultimate goal of the
copyright system is to provide incentives for authors to create and produce
literary and artistic works for their readers. The copyright system replaced
the crown patronage for literary and artistic production and copyright laws
replaced censorship and licensing practices of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries precisely to allow free and uncensored authorship to occur for the
benefit of society. The grant of the property right to authors provides the
necessary incentives for authors to imagine, write and express themselves
in works that their readers would like to receive and this process of
authorship and author-reader connection is encouraged through a
temporary but exclusive control that authors have over their works.
Professor Patterson argues that the right that printers and publishers (and

163.
164.
165.

Id. § 115.
Id. § 116.
Id. § 118.

166.

GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 9, at 309.

167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 310.
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other copyright owners) have is a negative covenant.170 This thought is a
compelling one when we consider the notion of authors and authorship
with the development of the market for creative and literary works and find
ways to ensure that creative authorship continues to flourish to produce an
abundance of literary and artistic works for the public.
Print privileges created a market for the trade of manuscripts as
physical objects, but the value of the expression in a manuscript as separate
from its physical manifestation was never acknowledged in the early
copyright statutes and cases. The market for creative and literary works
grew in response to commercial trade in literary and artistic works-as a
commodity that provided revenue for the investment that copyright owners
made in their works. However, the rights of copyright owners are, I
believe, subject to the author. For as Professor Jaszi rightfully pointed out,
the idea of authorship has been continually used and redeployed in debates
about copyright protection, which indicates to a large extent the central role
authors and the process of authorship play in copyright law. 171 The law
after all is about creativity and authorship rather than investments. 72 The
market for literary and artistic works ought to work towards creating the
necessary incentives for authorship to flourish and to connect authors with
their readers. Market mechanisms should facilitate creativity and move
from protecting economic interests of copyright owners to ensuring
authorship flourishes as well as enable greater author-reader connections.
Property rights provided through copyright enable authors to receive
incentives for their labor in creating the work, encouraged by the price that
their readers are willing to pay for their work. These rights allow the law
to recognize authors as the primary contributors to literary and artistic
diversity in the market.
The market for literary and artistic works, when controlled by
copyright owners, will give rise to the problems associated with expanding
property laws to internalize all externalities in the market as identified by
Professor Lemley in his article, Property, Intellectual Property and Free
Riding.173 The attempt to fully internalize all externalities is a concern that
follows the rights that lie with copyright owners, whose primary concern is
the recovery of investments made in the publication and distribution of the
work. Due to the investment made in publishing and distributing the work,
any form of enjoyment by the public is an externality that must be
internalized to ensure that the investment made in the work is fully

170.
171.
172.
173.

PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 73.
Jaszi, supra note 27, at 457.
Cornish, supra note 60, at 12.
Lemley, supra note 7.
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recovered. The grant of property rights to authors, on the other hand,
expects positive externalities to be present and enjoyed by the public
because the nature of authorship and creativity lies less in the economic
investment in producing a work and more in the creativity, labor,
imagination and use of other existing works in bringing literary and artistic
works to fruition. Copyright law is intended to ensure that the public has
literary and artistic works that they may use and the rights that the law
provides must ensure that literary and artistic works are produced. The best
guarantee that the law can have for an abundance of literary and artistic
works for the public is to ensure that authors have the necessary incentives
to create. This is done through the grant of the property right in works for
the act of creating; and the license copyright owners have to publish and
distribute the works should not overshadow the rights of the author. For if
it does, we may indeed need to have a perfectly acceptable answer to why
we should need copyright 174when there may be a better call to have
producers' investment laws.

174.

Comish, supra note 60, at 12.
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